It's coming up on the one year anniversary of the white house publishing it's "
National Strategy for Victory in Iraq". This is a document that every American ought to read, because it is supposed to tell us how we are going to win the Iraq war. And it appears that "win" is the only acceptable exit from Iraq. To mark this anniversary, let's review the strategy and how it has served us so far.
First of all, let's dispense with the obvious fact it's the slide handout from a PowerPoint presentation. Since there is no Dale Carnegie "Fighting An Insurgency in a Foreign Country" PowerPoint template, let's assume this presentation summarizing of the actual strategic process.
Many of the assumptions in the report haven't panned out (e.g. the potential role of Syria), but that's normal in any plan. The real problem with this document is that
it doesn't actually lay out any strategy for victory in Iraq.
The document has much that is valuable, plausible or at very least worth considering seriously. It tells us what have done so far; say what we are doing right now; it identifies various adversaries and players on the strategic landscape; and specifies what we hope will happen with those players in the future. In addition these future goals are themselves strategic steps in the wider "War on Terror" and "Freedom Agenda".
But notice there is a missing piece. Can you spot it?
What's missing is
how we are going to make our strategic goals in Iraq happen. Now granted we can't reveal all of our strategy. Much of that information would give our enemies an advantage. However, there are aspects of the strategic situation which are obvious and which require a public response. For example we know that at one point there was an "ink spot" strategy which was supposed to address the fact we didn't have the forces to pacify the entire country at once. This was the same strategy pursued by Lord Howe in his New Jersey campaign of 1776-1777 (see my essay on this). You pacify individual spots, then you spread the spots (like a tomato sauce stain on a white shirt) outward by fighting at the edge.
This was the last actual strategy for victory the administration, and it was a bad one.
Here is another consideration: We have the most powerful military in the world. Much of that power comes from two things: its extreme mobility, consisting of both speed and coordination; and the almost unimaginable lethality of each of its units. But we take that highly mobile, highly lethal military and force them to stay put in the middle of a bunch of civilians, where they can't do what they do best and every mistake has the potential to kill civilians and spark local and international outrage.
Surely addressing this problem needs to be part of our national strategy. There is no reason to hide this problem; on the contrary its so obvious that by ignoring it, we create more problems for ourselves. It is true that you "go to war with the army you have." But that's the very reason we need a strategy.
Another thing: there are no meaningful, measurable milestones for progress on the goals laid out.
Granted, we don't want a fixed timetable for withdrawal, but surely we can envision a sequence of events that will lead to redeploying our troops, even if we don't put a date on those events?
"We'll stand down as they stand up" isn't good enough, for several reasons. First, we aren't saying what we're going to do that's going to enable the Iraqis to "stand up", if they haven't been able to do so yet. This is not to say that the work we've been doing is worthless; on the contrary. It's just that every good thing we're doing is offset by other bad developments, resulting in a standstill on the progress towards victory
or withdrawal. This could be the very definition of bad strategy: when the impact your accomplishments are easily neutralized.
We should remember that we have not pacified the country yet, so standing down as they stand up means that the country will remain dangerous and unstable for the residents and remaining troops. That's even supposing that the new Iraqi forces are exact one to one replacements for coalition forces, which is doubtful. We might even need to send
more troops before we start removing them.
Even if we take Iraqi forces standing up as a given, surely we aren't going to stand our guys down on a battalion by battalion basis (about a thousand soldiers at a time). As significant groups of responsibilities are taken over by the Iraqi forces, we can redeploy our forces who perform those functions. What are those functions? The problem is that we don't have any signposts at that point the way to victory.
I think the inescapable conclusion is this: we don't really have a strategy for victory.
We do have goals, and we're working like hell to make them happen, but that isn't enough. The good things we accomplish somehow need to become more than the sum of their parts, and for that we a strategy that puts us in control of the future. The phrase "adapt to win" really means reacting to what the enemy does, and letting
that become our strategy. Letting the enemy determine our strategy multiplies their forces immeasurably, because they can choose the time and place of engagement. Every attempt to harden our forces against them will fail, because in the absence of any meaningful threat they have the leisure to study our efforts and react accordingly.
A strategy should be a road map to victory, or at least withdrawal on terms that are acceptable to us. Without that road map we face the prospects of endless stalemate or defeat. Endless stalemate is equivalent to defeat, except that it costs far more and there is no next time in which we can come back and win.
I believe withdrawal on favorable terms is still possible, but withdrawal of any kind is better than none.